Ms. Reeves,
I read with interest your statement of alleged copyright/IP infringement against the owner of the “smashthetrifecta” site:
http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/
and:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=104&topic_id=323463&mesg_id=323463
The purpose of this missive is to inform you of several basic facts:
1) I am the individual who provided that site’s owner with the files in question;
2) The files are up on other sites in addition to that one; I fully expect you’ll try bullying them into submission too;
3) Ultimately, this will not work because I *will* continue to distribute them under “fair use” principles.
I take this stance after repeated consultation with legal counsel. Allow me to elaborate:
Copyright law cannot be used to hide evidence of a crime. Diebold has clearly committed so many legal violations at this point, that “unclean hands” principles apply in spades.
a) Diebold had, on their website and available for public download, a copy of an elections data file created at 3:31pm on the day of the March 5th 2002 primary elections in San Luis Obispo County. There is no possible reason for that file to have been in Diebold’s possession. Under California law, it is illegal to release elections data before the close of the election. I suggest consulting with the SLO County Registrar, Julie Rodewald, to confirm the authenticity of this file which I provided her.
b) California Elections Code 19205(c) prevents the Calif Secretary of State from certifying electronic voting systems which are subject to tampering. There is ZERO practical security at all on the GEMS data management system. Anybody with a copy of MS-Access can alter voting data, passwords and audit trails at will, without leaving any trace. Worse, there is a runtime edition of MS-Access shipped on every GEMS box (central vote-count computer system as used with all Diebold Elections Systems products), which would allow exactly the same alterations from a script executed via a dial-in connection through the RAS server and Digiboard from a Touchscreen terminal, Optical Scan terminal or standard PC/Laptop. We can prove that Diebold would have enough access to the GEMS box in mid-election to “booger the vote” by their possession of the SLO county data file referred to above.
c) Internal memos slipped to activists BY DIEBOLD INSIDERS (the “1.8gigs of data” first referred to in Wired magazine) and in my possession show that Diebold field tech support staffs noticed teh “zero security under MS-Access” issue literally years ago, and deliberately kept it quiet from county elections officials and state certification boards. This constitutes pure criminal conspiracy.
d) The same internal memos reveal a widespread pattern of installing and using UNcertified versions of the various programs, both at the terminals and central vote-count box (running the “GEMS” app and related components).
e) While purporting to sell an application that operates under high security standards, your clients have displayed technical incompetence in security matters at a level seldom seen outside of a “Dilbert” comic strip.
To recap: your clients have set out to secretly rig elections. They have installed features into their software making it deliberatel open to tampering in ways that defeat the usual “spot recount of random precincts” procedures of honest local elections officials rely on.
Your clients actions are literally horrifying, evidence of nothing less than a coup attempt in progress. You will be hearing from me tomorrow by phone; if it is your client’s intent to sue me, I will facilitate that at the earliest possible convenience, in order to rape them in discovery and depositions and annihilate them in court.
You see, Ms. Reeves, sometimes when you push people around, you run into somebody who’s had about enough and isn’t going to back down.
I hate bullies. With a passion. I am going to *enjoy* our future interactions.
I guarantee you your clients won’t.
Jim March
Blind Carbon Copy to: a *whole* lotta people. 🙂
